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due to spectrum limitations. Generally, small networks can result from late entry, while large network operators are often former incumbents. For this reason, European regulators treat MTRs depending on the MNO market position. In particular, NRAs allow an entrant to set higher MTRs than incumbent operators, although the gap between MTRs is gradually reduced over time (asymmetric regulation).
The effi cacy of both glide path and asymmetric regulation in the wholesale markets is subject to debate. 3 Glide path regulation is often criticised by economists who are of the opinion that high MTRs intensify competition as an operator gains an additional consumer that provides higher MTR revenue. 4 Furthermore, in the presence of externalities (on both sides of the market) in the mobile industry, total welfare is maximal when prices for a multi-product 1 In fact, both retail market prices and MTRs were subject to regulation at the beginning of liberalisation. However, with the new communication framework in 2002, only MTRs remain regulated. The European mobile industry has evolved recently via service providers emerging in national markets due to liberalisation. It is well known that more players can contribute to market competitiveness, resulting in a gradual decline in retail prices and in more services offered. Also, having more mobile network operators (MNOs) is associated with network interconnection, i.e. mobile users can be connected to any other subscriber (any to any). However, the call originating operator must compensate the network operator for call termination via mobile termination rates (MTRs regulation. Accordingly, this paper evaluates the impact of MTR regulation on European MNO performance: entrant and incumbent. Furthermore, the fi rm performance indicators employed for the analysis are market share and profi tability (EBITDA margin). By estimating a dynamic econometric model using GMM, the study shows that MTR regulation directly positively impacts on the entrant market share, but negatively impacts on incumbent profi t. The market share impact is explained by entrants' incentive to increase customer base to gain scale economies and strengthen market position. Under call terminationbased price discrimination in Europe, the profi t effect results from stronger competition via European asymmetric regulation. The empirical results also indicate that MTR regulation indirectly raises the entrant profi t and hence strengthens sustainable competition between network operators in the long run. Consequently, the study provides evidence supporting current European MTR regulation.
Empirical Approach
European operators are categorised as either incumbents or entrants so as to enable the impact of MTR regulation on these groups to be investigated separately.
Econometric Specifi cation and Estimation Methodology
Next, consider that MNO business performance (e.g. market share or profi t) is determined by internal time effects, cross performance effects and MTR regulation.
Operators are likely to accumulate business stocks over time. 13 Hence, MNO business growth is in part based on own performance.
Another fi rm performance determinant represents the non-systematic relationship between business indicators and the effects possibly due to the fi rm's strategic development in Europe's mobile industry. For example, operators may forego short-run profi t to achieve (possibly) long-run market growth. Moreover, with the internal time effects, the relationship within the performance indicator is complex, as it not only affects own values but also other performance indicator future values. For example, higher market share increases the fi rm's future share and fi rm deviate from costs. 5 In particular, price setting in one market may substantially affect the other market price. This "waterbed effect" is explored in, for example, Schiff 6 and Genakos and Valletti 7 . Indeed, Genakos and Valletti show that when MTRs are regulated at lower levels, there is a waterbed effect and service prices are higher. With lower MTRs, MNOs derive less interconnection revenue, implying a smaller transfer to the end-user, and so increase retail prices to rebalance profi ts. The size of the waterbed effect is greatest when the fi rm's profi t is unaffected as retail prices fully adapt to MTR changes. That is, the fi rm is "profi t neutral" with regard to MTR levels. 8 Following this direction, Genakos and Valletti 9 show that OECD MNO profi ts are only mildly affected by MTR settings, suggesting that the impact of the waterbed is not complete. In the European context, Anderson and Hansen 10 show that the impact of MTR levels on operator profi t is insignifi cant. Accordingly, it appears that glide path regulation may not induce stronger market competition, and that light-hand regulation in wholesale markets should be implemented.
Because of small market shares, new entrant MTRs have a negligible impact on retail prices. 11 Furthermore, Peitz 12 argues that asymmetric regulation increases total consumer surplus, and entrant market share and profi t. In particular, with sequential MNO market entry, asymmetric regulation is necessary to promote long-term sustainable competition to allow late-entrant "catch up". While asymmetric regulation is replaced by symmetric regulation in some European countries, there are no clear guidelines as to the time length of sunset clauses for asymmetric regulation.
In summary, while the regulatory setting of MTRs substantially impacts on competitive strategy and market development, current economic arguments are unconvincing for regulatory practices, especially with a paucity of analysis on the effectiveness of European MTR
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REG k (performances are immediately affected by the MTR regulatory instrument).
Due to data availability 15 , the econometric analysis considers only a fi rst-order focus lag structure on fi rms' performance via the dynamic regression equation:
i,t are the indicators for either the market share or profi t for operator i at time t. MTR i,t is the glide path regulation index or the MTR level of operator i at time t.
E/I is the asymmetric regulation index or asymmetric regulatory benefi t for entrants (AR E i,t ) or the adverse effects on incumbents (AR I i,t ). 16
α o is the fi rm's correlated effect while κ t is a time dummy variable.
ε i,t are serially uncorrelated disturbances.
Despite the simple form, model specifi cations adequately account for all the three business determinant groups and allow one to examine strategic relationships between fi rm performance indicators as well as the impacts of MTR regulation on fi rm performance. The econometric model includes group and time effects. Additionally, the endogenous and lagged variables are on both sides of the econometric equations to account for the dynamics of fi rms' performance indicators. Consequently, using traditional estimation methods such as OLS, instrumental or even simultaneous estimation potentially provides biased and inconsistent estimates.
To deal with this issue, the dynamic GMM estimation for panel data, as proposed by Arellano and Bond 17 , is applied. Specifi cally, potential bias is treated by using all lagged differences as the valid instruments, and only the glide path regulation variable (MTR i,t ) is considered strictly exogenous. The asymmetric regulation index is, however, not treated as strictly exogenous because of the link with MTR levels, and asymmetric regulation and glide path 15 Indeed, because the data is limited to six periods, and nineteen (incumbent) and twenty-fi ve (entrant) cross-sections, only a small number of observations are applicable to more complex modelling.
(See the descriptive statistics in the box at the end of this article.) 16 For construction details and intuition, see the following subsection. 17 M. A r e l l a n o , S. Finally, the simultaneous MTR regulatory instruments, glide path regulation and asymmetric regulation, are expected to impact fi rm performance. For the ease of analysis, regulated MTR levels are assumed to be exogenous and instantly impact on MNO business activity. The potential limitations of this assumption concern the endogeneity of the MTR setting; since the fi nal regulatory decision on MTR is often a long process, relevant MNOs might lobby regulators to achieve the more desirable outcomes. 14 Another limitation is the potentially dynamic nature of the European MTR regulatory process, i.e. by anticipating regulatory intervention MNOs are able to adapt market strategy.
The determinants of the fi rm performance indicator PER p t time t have the form: Profi tability: As discussed above, European MNO market share and profi tability are likely endogenous. For example, higher market shares allow MNOs to reap greater profi t due to the importance of fi xed network investment costs and of economies of scale. In the business context with fi nancial constraints, higher profi t provides more financial leverage to gain additional market share. Figure 3 shows the relationship between market share and profi t, as well as heterogeneity between the operator groups regarding performance. Entrants are generally smaller than the incumbents in profi t and market share. Furthermore, the linear relationship between profi t and market share is positive and is relatively fl atter for the incumbent group (0.47 compared to 0.96 for the entrant). This suggests that profi tability and market shares might be bi-directionally linked depending on the operator positioning. Nevertheless, the systematic relationship between the indicators is explored empirically below.
Regulatory Indicators
To regulate MNO termination rates, European NRAs often simultaneously use glide path and asymmetric regulation instruments. Hence in evaluating the effectiveness of MTR regulation, both regulatory indicators are employed in the econometric model. 
Firm Performance Indicators
Based on received analysis, the most appropriate indicators for assessing fi rm performance are market share and profi t. The construction of the asymmetric regulation index for incumbent i at t is:
where α i,t and α j,t are, respectively, the market shares of operators i and j, where operators j are entrants. 21 Generally, the AR E i,t index is non-negative while AR I i,t has non-positive values. The value range indicates that asymmetric regulation benefi ts entrants but harms incumbents. Precisely, the higher an entrant index (AR E i,t ) value, the greater is the entrant benefi t, while higher incumbent index or lower AR I i,t absolute values indicate smaller incumbent adverse effects. Figure 5 illustrates the average values of the asymmetric regulation indexes for entrants and incumbents for 2002 through 2007. In particular, these data suggest symmetry and convergence to zero between the asymmetric regulatory indicators. This effect is due to the adoption of symmetric regulation in some European countries (e.g. Sweden from 2005) and the narrower MTR differentials. Also, this trend may refl ect regulatory rationales when setting the level of asymmetry with respect to the MTR margins in Europe, as in the case of France. 22 21 Some European nations have two operators in the incumbent group.
These data reveal that the MTRs of both operators are rarely different throughout the period examined. Hence, the asymmetric regulation index for an incumbent only accounts for MTR asymmetry between the incumbent and entrants in the same market. 22 ARCEP, décision 08-1176, available at: http://circa.europa.eu/Public/ irc/infso/ecctf/library?l=/france/adopted_measures/fr20080812/08-1176pdf/_FR_1.0_&a=d).
national infrastructure MNOs. 20 Furthermore, the data illustrates that there is a decreasing dispersion in the MTR levels between fi rms during the period. However, a downward trend is observed (see Figure 4 ). Typically, MNOs usually set MTRs at capped levels and hence the MTRs at operator level are suitable to proxy for European glide path regulation.
Asymmetric regulation (AR):
Asymmetric regulation is an effi cient regulatory instrument to assist entrants to "catch up" with incumbents and hence intensify sustainable long-term competition among infrastructure MNOs. Conventionally, asymmetric regulation benefi ts entrants while adversely impacting on incumbents. Furthermore, depending on market position and practical MTR implementation, the effect of asymmetric regulation on an MNO may be benefi cial or adverse. Although there is no systematic methodology, a good asymmetric regulation indicator should refl ect the MNO's impact on European MNOs. With this in mind, the asymmetric regulation indicator for operator i in the entrant group at t is:
where α i,t and α j,t are, respectively, operators' i and j market shares, where operator j is the incumbent operator(s) and any earlier entrant operator than i, and MTR i,t and MTR j,t are the termination rates of operators i and j, respectively.
The asymmetric regulation indicator for an incumbent represents the adverse effect of asymmetric regulation.
20 European Commission, op. cit. among MNOs 24 , damaging incumbents' performance. Moreover, as incumbent market shares are relatively stable, European asymmetric regulation is likely to reduce incumbent profi t. Should fi rms partially control the relationship between market share and profi t, these empirical results imply that incumbents must spend greater financial effort (e.g. by lowering service price or increasing handset subsidies) to compete and retain market share under asymmetric regulation.
Figure 4 The Setting of MTRs in Europe
Finally, since there is no reported impact of incumbent market share on profi t, and vice versa, the indirect impact of MTR regulation on incumbent performance is not clear. This is not the case for the entrant group. In conclusion, the results demonstrate that the relationship between profi t and market share for European incumbents is weak, and asymmetric regulation could result in stronger competition across the European mobile industry, which might then negatively impact on incumbent profi t. 
Entrant Group

Estimation Results
The estimation results are reported for both MNO groups: Table 1 for incumbents and Table 2 for entrants. Furthermore, the Sargan test of over-identifi ed restrictions shows that the instrumental set is valid. First, the relationship between the fi rm performance variables (both internal and cross effects) is analysed. Second the direct impact of MTR regulation on fi rm performance is determined. Finally, the indirect impact of MTR regulation due to the endogeneity between the performance indicators is explored. Table 1 indicates that incumbents' profi t and market shares are impacted only by own lagged variables, but not other performance variables. This result refl ects the dynamic growth of European mobile telephony, as operators are likely to accumulate market share and profi t, i.e. own lagged variables are decisive for the current values. Furthermore, Table 1 shows that the own lagged market share coeffi cient (0.81) is close to unity, while the lagged profi tability coeffi cient (0.13) is closer to zero. This fi nding suggests that the incumbent shares are highly predictable from past values and that other exogenous variables have only a minor impact on share values.
Incumbent Group
This fi nding does not hold for incumbent profi ts. In accordance with Figure 3 , which demonstrates the relatively fl at relationship for the incumbent group, there is an insignifi cant relationship between the performance indicators in Table 1 .
Additionally, the direct consequences of MTR regulation, comprised of glide path and asymmetric regulation variables, on incumbent performance are presented in Table 1 . "Profi t neutrality" is supported by the insignifi cant impact coeffi cient of the MTRs on incumbent profi tability.
Moreover, Table 1 also indicates that asymmetric regulation reduces incumbent profi t (estimated coeffi cient 0.57) and might be explained by asymmetric MTRs' resulting in an increase in incumbents' wholesale costs, thus negatively affecting total profi t. 23 Nevertheless, since European MNOs can discriminate fi nal prices based on call termination (on-net and off-net price discrimination), and because of incumbent profi t neutrality, wholesale costs due to asymmetric MTRs are likely recovered from retail revenues. Another possibility is that European asymmetric regulation induces stronger competitive pricing strategies 
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bent market shares because of the insignifi cant relationship between profi tability and market share. However, this is not the case for entrants, with MTR regulation having an indirect effect on profi t. Specifi cally, a percentage reduction in MTRs via glide path regulation increases entrant shares by 0.32 per cent, and profi ts by 0.2 per cent (as the entrants' impact coeffi cient for market share on profi tability is 0.62). Similarly, the indirect impact of asymmetric regulation on the EBITDA margin is 0.29. This value is calculated from the product of the impact of asymmetric regulation on entrant market share (0.47) and a percentage increase in entrants' market share on profi t (0.62).
Policy Discussions
Based on the estimation results presented above, several interesting issues in economics and regulatory policy are discussed in the following.
The waterbed effect shows that changing MTRs can affect mobile prices, which is detrimental to subscribers. Specifi cally, MNOs retain their profi t with lower regulated MTRs by charging higher retail prices. 26 However, since European MNOs are heterogeneous in market positioning and business strategy, waterbed effects may not arise globally when there is glide path regulation. Indeed, the analysis shows that, by accounting for heterogeneity, profi t neutrality is likely to apply to incumbents, but not entrants. Clearly, our study shows that European entrant MNOs can indirectly increase their profi t via glide path regulation. Thus, glide path regulation supports entrant price reduction strategy to gain market share and is an 26 C. G e n a k o s , T. Va l l e t t i , op. cit; K. A n d e r s o n , B. H a n s e n , op. cit.
The endogenous impact of entrants' profi t on market share is, however, more complex. In particular, a per cent increase in the current EBITDA margin raises entrants' fi nancial capacity to gain an additional 0.27 per cent of market share. A per cent decline in the EBITDA margin (fi rst order lag) increases entrant market share by 0.7 per cent, i.e. due to the increased future market share an entrant must increase current expenditure, e.g. increase marketing expenditure or lower service prices to attract subscribers.
The impact of European regulations is also shown in Table 2. Broadly speaking, MTR regulation increases entrant market shares but not profi t. In particular, glide path regulation increases entrant market share by 0.32 per cent (per cent reduction in the regulated MTR). Glide path regulation increases entrant attractiveness as its off-net call price can be set lower (raising rivals' costs strategy). Moreover, from a dynamic viewpoint, profi tability should depend more on the retail market as interconnection revenue from the fi xed network is lower when MTRs fall, and hence an entrant is more incited to increase its share to make network usage effi cient.
Regarding the impact of asymmetric regulation, the estimation results show that only entrant market shares increase (by 0.47 per cent) in response to a percentage increase in the entrant asymmetric regulation indicator (AR E i,t ). This outcome presents strong evidence in support of Peitz 25 who shows that asymmetric regulation directly increases entrant profi t, and that entrants might rely on the benefi t from higher MTRs and not from competing with the incumbent. This result, however, suggests that any advantage from higher MTRs is immediately transferred to fi nal consumers to increase the entrants' competitive position. The result is not surprising since entrants often have a strong incentive to enhance market shares (to achieve economies of scale for example), and asymmetric regulation provides appropriate fi nancial conditions. For this reason, the direct impact of asymmetric regulation on the entrant profi t is insignifi cant.
It is worth noting that the indicator of asymmetric regulation depends both on the magnitude of relative MTRs and market shares, and thus a higher indicator value does not necessarily imply allowing entrants to set higher MTRs. Rather, this can also be achieved via greater entrant share. Asymmetric regulation which applies to service providers is widespread in telecommunication markets. 27 Our paper shows that the implementation of asymmetric regulation in setting MTRs in the European mobile industry indirectly boosts entrant profi tability because of their success in acquiring more market shares coinciding with the "sustainable long-term competition" objective. Furthermore, this fi nding eliminates the possibility of rent-seeking behaviour and implies that entrants spend efforts to compete for new customers under asymmetric regulation.
Conversely, the analysis shows that asymmetric regulation has only a modest negative impact on incumbent profi tability; but since incumbent profi tability is neutral with regard to MTR levels, the lower incumbent profi tability is possibly a response to stronger market competition among asymmetric MNOs. Hence, a sunset clause on current European asymmetric regulation is not recommended based on these fi ndings.
Incumbent Operators and Descriptive Statistics Entrant Operators and Descriptive Statistics
Conclusion
This paper empirically studies the impacts of MTR regulation in European mobile telephony. By dividing MNOs into groups and based on the relationship of fi rm performances, the econometric results show that there is little risk from current MTR regulation for the incumbent operators, while MTR regulation positively impacts the entrant operators. To summarise: market shares and profi tability are bi-directionally linked, and this relationship is closer for entrants. Second, MTR regulation boosts entrant market share and modestly affects incumbent profi tability. Third, there is no supporting evidence of rent-seeking behaviour by entrants. Finally, entrant profi t is higher as a result of increased market share. Subsequent empirical study will provide intuitive reasons for potential intervention in setting the MTRs in European wholesale markets.
